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It’s My Party, and I’ll Do What I Want to:  
Making the Case for Judicial Review of 
National Interest Waiver Denials 
M. Hunter Rush* 
Abstract 
Politics and personal beliefs have become increasingly 
intertwined since the founding of the United States. Few issues have 
divided Americans more than immigration laws and policies. This 
Note advances the argument that when a noncitizen’s application 
for a National Interest Waiver is denied, there must be some 
recourse. The current problem is exacerbated when the United 
States Citizenship and Immigration Services, on behalf of the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, denies a waiver for what appears 
to be racially or religiously motivated purposes. Judicial review in 
an Article III court is the most neutral forum of review that a 
noncitizen residing in the United States has if he or she feels the 
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I. Introduction 
Without judicial review, executive agency officials—
handpicked by a President in power—can make arbitrary and 
capricious decisions rooted in their political principles and biases.1 
When the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
 
 1.  See R. Douglas Arnold, Political Control of Administrative Officials, 3 J. 
L., ECON, & ORG. 279, 279 (1987) (explaining how elected officials, while forced to 
delegate some decision-making authority to administrative agencies, try to 
ensure that their proxies make the same or similar decisions they would make 
themselves); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018) (“The reviewing court shall—hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be—
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.”). 
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(USCIS) denies a national interest waiver for an 
employment-based visa, neither the agency nor the Secretary of 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) needs to explain its 
decision-making process.2 Since there are no defined statutory 
procedures for when to grant or deny a national interest waiver, 
Article I immigration judges have developed a three-prong test 
through case law, which USCIS has adopted as precedent.3 
Without arbitrary and capricious judicial review when an 
applicant has been denied a national interest waiver, USCIS can 
undo federal legislation—legislation that recognizes the benefit to 
the American public of granting waivers—all in the name of 
unbridled discretion.4 
USCIS is a component of the Department of Homeland 
Security.5 USCIS “is the federal agency that oversees lawful 
immigration to the United States.”6 Title 8 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations guides most of USCIS’s decisions and procedures, as 
“it deals with ‘Aliens7 and Nationality,’ as does Title 8 of the U.S. 
 
 2.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2) (2018) (describing how the Attorney General 
[(now the DHS Secretary)] may grant national interest waivers for 
employment-based visas when the applicant does not have the required pending 
job offer); see also Poursina v. USCIS, 936 F.3d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(“Congress’s use of ‘may’—rather than ‘must’ or ‘shall’—brings along the usual 
presumption of discretion.”). 
 3.  See Dhanasar, 26 I. & N. Dec. 884, 884 (Dec. 27, 2016) (“(1) that the 
foreign national’s proposed endeavor has both substantial merit and national 
importance; (2) that he or she is well positioned to advance the proposed endeavor; 
and (3) that, on balance, it would be beneficial to the United States to waive the 
job offer and labor certification requirements.”). 
 4.  See Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1242 
(2016) (“When judges defer to agency interpretations, they abandon their office of 
independent judgment and engage in systematic bias, and these dangers, being 
clear violations of Article III and the Fifth Amendment, are far more serious than 
the difficulties of wrestling with open-ended statutes.”). 
 5.  See About DHS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (July 5, 2019), 
https://www.dhs.gov/about-dhs (last updated Feb. 26, 2021) (noting that DHS’s 
more than 240,000 employees focus on border security, cybersecurity, and other 
jobs to protect the United States) [perma.cc/R7ZA-SDZP]. 
 6.  What We Do, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Apr. 12, 2018), 
https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/what-we-do (last updated Feb. 27, 2020) 
[perma.cc/LFE6-WSS2]. 
 7.  The term “alien” is a statutory one and is used throughout this Note for 
that reason alone. President Biden has proposed replacing this term with the 
word “noncitizen.” See Nicole Acevedo, Biden Seeks to Replace ‘Alien’ with Less 
‘Dehumanizing Term’ in Immigration Laws, NBC NEWS (Jan. 22, 2021), 
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Code.”8 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2), “Aliens who are members of 
the professions holding advanced degrees or aliens of exceptional 
ability” may be granted employment-based immigrant visas by 
USCIS.9 To be qualified, applicants must be 
[M]embers of the professions holding advanced degrees or their 
equivalent or who because of their exceptional ability in the 
sciences, arts, or business, will substantially benefit 
prospectively the national economy, cultural or educational 
interests, or welfare of the United States, and whose services in 
the sciences, arts, professions, or business are sought by an 
employer in the United States.”10 
Furthermore, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182, employers must 
procure a Department of Labor (DOL) certification of no adverse 
effects on U.S. labor markets or wages before they can hire any 
foreign nationals.11 However, Congress and immigration case law 
have carved out exceptions and procedures for both the job-offer 
and labor certification requirements.12 In addition to Congress and 
executive agencies, federal courts have also added to the discourse 
regarding the employment-based visa process.13 
 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/biden-seeks-replace-alien-less-
dehumanizing-term-immigration-laws-n1255350 (“The bill . . . further recognizes 
America as a nation of immigrants . . . .’”) [perma.cc/3UUV-K8LK]. 
 8.  Title 8, Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. 
(Sep. 10, 2013), https://www.uscis.gov/legal-resources/8-cfr/title-8-code-federal-
regulations (last updated July 9, 2020) [perma.cc/PU2L-4XWB]. 
 9.  8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2) (2018). 
 10.  Id. § 1153(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
 11.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i) (2018) (requiring a DOL confirmation that 
there are not currently enough qualified, capable, and willing nationals to 
perform the job and that such employment will not adversely affect the wages of 
U.S. nationals similarly employed); see also Dhanasar, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 885 
(explaining that the employer must test the labor market to identify qualified 
nationals, get the DOL to confirm there are none, obtain the labor certification, 
and then file a petition for an employment visa). 
 12.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(B) (2018) (describing the Attorney General’s 
role in granting job-offer waivers if he or she believes it is in the best interest of 
the United States); 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(4)(ii) (2018) (“The director may exempt the 
requirement of a job offer, and thus of a labor certification, for aliens of 
exceptional ability in the sciences, arts, or business if exemption would be in the 
national interest.”); see also Dhanasar, 26 I. & N. Dec. 884, 891 (Dec. 27, 2016) 
(“We emphasize that, in each case, the factor(s) considered must, taken together, 
indicate that on balance, it would be beneficial to the United States to waive the 
requirements of a job offer and thus of a labor certification.”). 
 13. See, e.g., ANA Int’l., Inc. v. Way, 393 F.3d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 2004) 
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In 2004, the Ninth Circuit held that federal courts could 
review employment-based visa revocation decisions.14 In 2019, the 
same court, however, held that “USCIS’s decision to deny a 
national interest waiver was a discretionary decision that the court 
lacked jurisdiction to review”15 even though the statutory language 
for revoking approved visa petitions is similar to that of granting 
national interest waivers.16 Writing for the Ninth Circuit, Judge 
O’Scannlain stated that the 2004 precedent is “an outlier among 
the federal circuit courts.”17 He went on to cite seven other circuits 
with conflicting decisions.18 It may be easier to understand this 
change of opinion by understanding how immigration laws have 
evolved over time. 
Part I of this Note explores the vast political history of U.S. 
immigration law. It demonstrates how the pendulum of morality 
has swung back and forth over time between pro- and 
anti-immigrant positions. This has commonly been in response to 
whichever party had a President in the White House or held a 
 
(“Because the jurisdiction-stripping provision of IIRIRA that is at issue 
supersedes the jurisdiction-limiting provision in the APA, we decline to reach the 
question whether the APA precludes judicial review of visa revocation 
decisions.”). 
 14.  See id. at 889 (“We hold that the statute does not bar judicial review of a 
visa revocation decision . . . .”). 
 15.  See Poursina v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 936 F.3d 868, 870 
(9th Cir. 2019). 
 16.  See id. at 876 (explaining that the ANA International holding should be 
extended narrowly and is inapplicable in this case); compare 8 U.S.C § 1155 
(2018) (“The Secretary of Homeland Security may, at any time, for what he deems 
to be good and sufficient cause, revoke the approval of any petition approved by 
him under section 1154 of this title.”), with 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(B)(i) (2018) 
(“[T]he Attorney General may, when the Attorney General deems it to be in the 
national interest, waive the requirements of subparagraph (A) that an alien’s 
services in the sciences, arts, professions, or business be sought by an employer 
in the United States.”). 
 17.  See Poursina, 936 F.3d at 875 (stating that the Ninth Circuit is now 
unwilling to rule contrary to a majority of federal appellate courts). 
 18.  See id. (citing Bernardo ex rel. M & K Eng’g, Inc. v. Johnson, 814 F.3d 
481, 484–85 (1st Cir. 2016); Mehanna v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 677 
F.3d 312, 314–15 (6th Cir. 2012); Green v. Napolitano, 627 F.3d 1341, 1345 n.3 
(10th Cir. 2010); Abdelwahab v. Frazier, 578 F.3d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 2009); Jilin 
Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Chertoff, 447 F.3d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 2006); Holy Virgin Prot. 
Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia v. Chertoff, 499 F.3d 
658, 661–62 (7th Cir. 2007); Ghanem v. Upchurch, 481 F.3d 222, 223–25 (5th Cir. 
2007)). 
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majority in Congress.19 This section does not aim to prove that 
many recent immigration laws are potentially racist or biased—
that does not need proving.20 Instead, it shows that immigration 
laws over the years have reflected the racial views of the President 
or Congress that created them and grounds the rest of the Note to 
state what is at stake if non-discretionary decisions are not 
afforded judicial review. 
Part II analyzes the legislative history and purpose of sections 
1153 and 1155 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.21 This 
section presents legal theories and public policy rationales for 
section 1153(b)(2)(B)(i), national interest waivers.22 It explores 
how USCIS exercises discretion in granting national interest 
waivers or issuing revocations and the role Article III courts have 
played in resolving specific legal disputes.23 Additionally, it 
reviews available data to determine how second preference 
employment-based visas are allocated each year as well as the 
geographical regions of origin of applicants who receive them. 
Part III advocates for the position that Article III courts 
should have the ability to review national interest waiver denials 
issued by USCIS.24 In addition to highlighting the language of the 
statute, this Part shows that if the DHS Secretary had completely 
unbridled discretion to grant or deny national interest waivers, he 
 
 19.  Infra Part I. 
 20.  See, e.g., Fatima E. Marouf, Implicit Bias and Immigration Courts, 45 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 417, 419–26 (2011) (exploring explicit and implicit racial 
discrimination in immigration law throughout the history of the United States 
especially in relation to matters of national security); Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the 
Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations:  A “Magic Mirror’’ into the Heart 
of Darkness, 73 IND. L. J. 1111, 1113 (1998) (“[T]he Supreme Court has invoked 
the [plenary power] doctrine to permit the federal government, and at times the 
states, to discriminate against immigrants with the lawful right to remain 
permanently in this country.”). 
 21.  Infra Part II; see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 1155 (2018). 
 22.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2) (2018) (describing procedures for granting 
exceptional ability work visas and the national interest waiver when an applicant 
does not have a pending offer of employment). 
 23.  Compare ANA Int’l, Inc. v. Way, 393 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that visa revocation decisions are reviewable by Article III courts), with 
Poursina v. USCIS, 936 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that denials of 
national interest waivers by USCIS are discretionary and not reviewable); see also 
infra Part III.A (providing a history of the distribution of employment-based 
visas). 
 24.  Infra Part III. 
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or she would undoubtedly make decisions based on the political or 
ideological views of the President. This completely defeats the 
legislative purpose of national interest waivers. There must be a 
system in place that follows objective standards that outlast any 
Administration and not the exercise of discretion based on the 
whims or racial and ethnic biases of a sitting President. The 
solution, this Note argues, is to make it clear that the judiciary has 
the power to review national interest waiver denials to provide 
applicants with a politically neutral forum of review by insuring 
application of objective standards set by Article I courts. 
II. Part I:  The Political History of U.S. Immigration Law 
A. From the Beginning:  Race, War, and Labor 
The first immigration legislation in the United States was the 
Naturalization Act of 1790.25 In the beginning, U.S. citizenship 
was reserved for free white men of good character who had resided 
in the country for at least two years.26 Congress further defined 
citizenship by allowing only non-violent aliens to be naturalized 
with the passage of the Alien Friends Act of 1798.27 This statute 
gave rise to the country’s first deportation laws but was short lived 
and ineffective.28 In anticipation of possible international conflict, 
 
 25.  See U.S. Immigration Timeline, HISTORY.COM (Dec. 21, 2018), 
https://www.history.com/topics/immigration/immigration-united-states-timeline 
(last updated May 14, 2019) (“Congress passes the first law about who should be 
granted U.S. citizenship.”) [perma.cc/U2SX-G5DG]; see generally 1790 
Naturalization Act, 2d Sess., ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790). 
 26.  See 1790 Naturalization Act, 1 Stat. at 103 (“[A]ny alien, being a free 
white person, who shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction 
of the United States for the term of two years, may be admitted to become a citizen 
thereof.”). 
 27.  See D’Vera Cohn, How U.S. Immigration Laws and Rules Have Changed 
Through History, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 30, 2015), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/09/30/how-u-s-immigration-laws-
and-rules-have-changed-through-history/ (“The Alien Friends Act authorized the 
president to imprison or deport any alien who was deemed dangerous to the U.S.”) 
[perma.cc/47N4-2QJY]. 
 28.  See Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration, Sovereignty, and the Constitution 
of Foreignness, 45 CONN. L. REV. 743, 760 n.83 (2013) (“The Act expired by its own 
terms after two years, in 1800, and no alien was ever deported under the Act.”). 
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Congress passed the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 to allow the 
executive to imprison and deport male aliens aged 14 and older 
during times of war.29 
Following the War of 1812, the United States continued 
asserting itself as an emerging power—eager to grow its size, 
influence, and economy.30 This led to laws that improved travel 
conditions for immigrants sailing to the United States who were 
determined to secure readily available manufacturing jobs.31 
President Lincoln signed the Homestead Act in 1862, in part, to 
entice immigrants to join the United States military and help put 
an end to the Civil War.32 As the war was ending, many employers 
were left in search of laborers.33 Congress responded with the 
 
 29.  See An Act Respecting Alien Enemies, 5th Sess., ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) 
(“[W]henever there shall be a declared war between the United States and any 
foreign nation or government, . . . all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the 
hostile nation or government, . . . shall be . . . removed, as alien enemies.”); see 
also Robert Bernheim, Putting the “Alien” Back into Alienage Jurisdiction:  
Alienage Jurisdiction and “Stateless” Persons and Corporations after Traffic 
Stream, 47 AZ. L. REV. 1003, 1015 (2005) (“A “denizen” was traditionally a 
classification between alien and naturalized citizen, somewhat akin to the 
modern permanent resident alien.”). 
 30.  See WILLIAM EARL WEEKS, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND AMERICAN GLOBAL 
EMPIRE 42 (2002) (“Changing economic conditions had inspired a new vision of 
American empire based not on free trade but on protection of certain sectors of 
the economy.”). 
 31.  See, e.g., U.S. Immigration Timeline, supra note 25 (“[T]he United States 
passes the Steerage Act of 1819 requiring better conditions on ships arriving to 
the country. The Act also calls for ship captains to submit demographic 
information on passengers, creating the first federal records on the ethnic 
composition of immigrants to the United States.”); see also WEEKS, supra note 30 
(“The shortages caused by embargo and war had led to the growth of an extensive 
manufacturing sector in the United States and a sizable constituency that wanted 
it protected from foreign competition, once peace was restored.”). 
 32.  See Robbie J. Totten, International Relations, Material and Military 
Power, and United States Immigration Policy:  American Strategies to Utilize 
Foreigners for Geopolitical Strength, 1607 to 2012, 29 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 205, 226 
(2015). 
[T]he Homestead Act . . . offered 160 acres of free land to foreigners 
(assuming upon acceptance they filed a declaration for U.S. citizenry) 
who worked it for five years. Shortly after its passage, Lincoln sought 
to further induce immigration and urged legislators to devise a direct 
“system for the encouragement of immigration” to attract Europeans 
because they constituted a “source of national wealth and strength” 
required as war intensified. 
 33.  See Deborah A. Ballam, Exploding the Original Myth Regarding 
Employment-at-Will:  The True Origins of the Doctrine, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
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Immigration Act of 1864 to provide foreign workers with an easier 
path to the United States.34 Congress continued developing the 
field of immigration law with the Naturalization Act of 1870, an 
amendment to the 1790 Act.35 This amendment provided aliens of 
African descent with a path to citizenship, but Asians and Native 
Americans were still statutorily excluded from seeking 
citizenship.36 Much of the immigration legislation to come would 
be crafted to limit citizenship to immigrants who did not disrupt 
social, economic, and political life in the United States.37 
B. Expanding Exclusions:  The Ailing, Awry, and Asian Need Not 
Apply 
Postbellum America was a time of desired unity and change.38 
In an attempt to distance itself from what many perceived as a 
 
LAB. L. 91, 101 (1996) (“The economy also affected the demand for labor. Because 
of the ‘boom and bust cycles of the lumbering industry,’ workers ‘were subject to 
frequent lay-offs, shortages of pay, and periods of marginal employment.’”). 
 34.  See Wesley Allen Riddle, The Origins of Black Sharecropping, 49 MISS. 
Q. 53, 70 (1995) (“[T]he Immigration Act of 1864 legalized entry of contract labor 
from Europe and Asia under terms worse than those of sharecropping.”); see also 
Cohn, supra note 27 (“To address labor shortages due to the Civil War, this act 
made contracts for immigrant labor formed abroad enforceable by U.S. courts.”). 
 35.  See Lori A. Nessel, Instilling Fear and Regulating Behavior:  
Immigration Law as Social Control, 31 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 525, 531 n.29 (2017) 
(“Designed to increase the flow of immigrant laborers to the US to ameliorate the 
disruptions of the Civil War, the Act provided for the appointment of a 
commissioner on immigration and immigrant labor contracts with funded 
transportation to the U.S.”). 
 36.  See Michael Park, Asian American Masculinity Eclipsed:  A Legal and 
Historical Perspective of Emasculation Through U.S. Immigration Practices, 8 
MOD. AM. 5, 7 n.36 (2013) (“The Naturalization Act of 1870 amended the 
naturalization law to conform with the intent of the Reconstruction amendments 
and allowed ‘aliens of African nativity and descent’ to become naturalized 
citizens.”). 
 37.  See, e.g., Angela M. Banks, Precarious Citizenship:  Asian Immigrant 
Naturalization 1918 to 1925, 37 L. & INEQ. 149, 159 (2019) (“Racial requirements 
for naturalization represent implicit cultural assimilation requirements. These 
requirements use race as a category for evaluating values, norms, or practices 
rather than evaluating each individual candidate based on criteria that directly 
measure the desired values, norms, and practices.”). 
 38.  See David E. Guinn, Constitutional Intent and Interpretation:  A 
Response to Black’s View of Constitutional Rights, 11 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L. 
J. 225, 247 (2001) (“As noted by the Civil War historian Shelby Foote, before the 
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depraved past, Congress passed legislation to prevent “immoral” 
immigrants from entering the country.39 The Page Act of 1875 was 
one of the “first federal law[s] [explicitly] restricting immigration 
in the nation’s history.”40 This Act specifically prohibited the 
immigration of criminals, prostitutes, and anyone of Asian descent 
who contracted to perform “lewd and immoral” acts in the United 
States.41 With the Page Act, Congress sought to establish a new 
American tradition of purity and strong family values.42 The 
Immigration Act of 1891 perfectly expressed this attitude of 
righteousness by barring those aliens who would blemish 
America’s new “reputation.”43 This Act also established a federal 
bureau of immigration, to be headed by a presidentially appointed 
superintendent.44 
 
Civil War the country was spoken of as these United States (plural) and 
subsequent to the war it was referred to as the United States (singular).”). 
 39.  See, e.g., Kitty Calavita, Collisions at the Intersection of Gender, Race, 
and Class:  Enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Laws, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV. 249, 251 
(2006) (“So encompassing was the stereotype of Chinese women as prostitutes 
that Congress presumed it had addressed their immigration with the Page Act of 
1875 barring prostitutes.”). 
 40.  Kai Bartolomeo, Immigration and the Constitutionality of Local Self 
Help:  Esc, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 855, 860 (2008) (emphasis added). 
 41.  See Act of Mar. 3, 1875 (Page Law), ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974) 
(explaining that consul-generals were responsible for determining whether newly 
arrived immigrants had entered into forbidden contracts or had fled felony 
convictions). 
 42.  See Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of 
Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 643 (2005) 
The text, legislative history, historical context, and enforcement of the 
Page Law indicate that one of its animating purposes was to prevent 
the Chinese practices of polygamy and prostitution from gaining a 
foothold in the United States. Thus, concern about preserving 
traditional American conceptions of marriage and family lies at the 
root of our federal immigration system. 
 43.  See Immigration Act of 1891, 2d Sess., ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891) 
[Excluding] from admission into the United States . . . [a]ll idiots, 
insane persons, paupers or persons likely to become a public charge, 
persons suffering from a loathsome or a dangerous contagious disease, 
persons who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous crime 
or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, [and] polygamists . . . . 
 44.  See id. 
The superintendent of immigration shall be an officer in the Treasury 
Department, under the control and supervision of the Secretary of the 
Treasury, to whom he shall make annual reports in writing of the 
transactions of his office, together with such special reports, in writing, 
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The Immigration Act of 1903 added to the list of excluded 
aliens by barring epileptics, professional beggars, anarchists, and 
sex traffickers.45 Congress may have “justified” excluding from the 
United States aliens who shared stigmas such as mental illnesses, 
contagious diseases, and criminal records for the sake of American 
morality or values.46 However, Congress nearly abandoned its 
thinly veiled attempts to hide its real purpose of keeping America 
as white and as male as possible with other immigration 
legislation of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.47 
Many American workers viewed the arrival of Chinese 
immigrants as the reason for the country’s failing economy in the 
late 1800s.48 This mentality seeped into the legislature and 
generated the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.49 Under this 
discriminatory law, Chinese laborers were banned from entering 
the United States for a decade.50 The Geary Act extended this ban 
and imposed further restrictions and penalties on Chinese 
 
as the Secretary of the Treasury shall require. 
 45.  See Cohn, supra note 27 (“It is the first U.S. law to restrict immigration 
based on immigrants’ political beliefs.”); see generally Immigration Act of 1903, 
2d Sess., ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213–22 (1903). 
 46.  See, e.g., Pooja R. Dadhania, Deporting Undesirable Women, 9 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 53, 60 (2018) (“In 1903, Congress passed a comprehensive piece of 
immigration legislation that strengthened the provisions of the Page Law for the 
same purpose—to protect American morality from noncitizen women.”). 
 47.  See, e.g., Chinese Exclusion Act, 1st Sess., ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) 
(banning Chinese laborers from entering the United States); Immigration Act of 
1917, 2d Sess., ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (1917) (banning the immigration of people from 
almost every Asian country). 
 48.  See Chinese Exclusion Act, HISTORY.COM (Aug. 24, 2018), 
https://www.history.com/topics/immigration/chinese-exclusion-act-1882 (last 
updated Sep. 13, 2019) (describing how many Americans attributed the decline in 
wages to the influx of Chinese immigrants to the United States following the 
California Gold Rush) [perma.cc/CHR2-YM3V]. 
 49.  See Chinese Exclusion Act, supra note 47, at 59 (“The coming of Chinese 
laborers to this country endangers the good order of certain localities within the 
territory thereof.”). 
 50.  See id. (penalizing vessel masters who knowingly brought Chinese 
laborers into the country with a year or less of jail time and a fine of up to $500 
for each laborer); Kitty Calavita, The Paradoxes of Race, Class, Identity, and 
“Passing”:  Enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 1882–1910, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 
1, 1 (2000 (“Declaring that ‘the Chinese are peculiar in every respect,’ Congress 
passed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 barring the entry into the United States 
of all Chinese laborers for a period of 10 years.” (quoting 47 CONG. REC. 2597 
(1882) (statement of Sen. Sherman)). 
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immigrants.51 For example, beginning in 1892, Chinese 
immigrants were required to present proof of residency if 
questioned by law enforcement officers.52 If a court found any 
person of Chinese heritage or ancestry unlawfully in the country, 
the Geary Act authorized a sentence of up to one year of hard 
labor.53  
Data on the number of aliens excluded from entry to the 
United States during the early 1900s are somewhat misleading.54 
At any rate, many legislators felt that federal laws restricting 
classes of immigrants were not effectively limiting the overall 
number of immigrants entering the country—a desired result at 
the time.55 It is true that the eruption of World War I temporarily 
reduced immigration to the United States.56 Following the Great 
War, however, Congress passed legislation to limit the number of 
immigrant visas granted each year.57 These limitations did not 
 
 51.  See An Act to Prohibit the Coming of Chinese Persons into the United 
States, 1st Sess., ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25–26 (1892) [hereinafter the “Geary Act”] 
(extending the Chinese Exclusion Act by ten years, permitting the deportation of 
Chinese immigrants following the conviction of any crime and allowing only white 
witnesses to testify to the immigrants’ lawful residency). 
 52.  See id. (explaining that once Chinese immigrants were arrested and 
presented proof of their right to be in the country, justices, judges or 
commissioners determined whether the proof was sufficient). 
 53.  See id. (noting that after serving the sentence, Chinese immigrants 
would be deported). 
 54.  See Mass Immigration and WWI, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. 
(Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.uscis.gov/history-and-genealogy/our-history/agency-
history/mass-immigration-and-wwi (last updated July 30, 2020) (describing how 
the Immigration Act of 1917 authorized medical screens at points of foreign 
departure and those found ineligible to embark were not technically considered 
excluded from entering the United States) [perma.cc/URF3-TSQN]. 
 55.  See The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act), U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-
1936/immigration-act (“The literacy test alone was not enough to prevent most 
potential immigrants from entering, so members of Congress sought a new way 
to restrict immigration in the 1920s.”) [perma.cc/Z65Q-6NFN]. 
 56.  See Mass Immigration, supra note 54 (“Between 1900 and 1920 the 
nation admitted over 14.5 million immigrants.”). 
 57.  See Emergency Quota Act of 1921, 1st Sess., ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5 (1921)  
[T]he number of aliens of any nationality who may be admitted under 
the immigration laws to the United States in any fiscal year shall be 
limited to 3 per centum of the number of foreign-born persons of such 
nationality resident in the United States as determined by the United 
States census of 1910. 
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apply to government officials, short-term visitors, learned 
professionals, or immigrants from the Western Hemisphere.58 
Notably, the introduction of the country’s first numerical quota 
system for immigration based on nationality did not permit 
issuance of visas for those from Asian countries.59 
While not directly related, the Eighteenth Amendment’s 
prohibition on liquor going into effect in 1920 and the Immigration 
Act of 1924 permanently cementing the immigration limits 
established by the Emergency Quota Act of 1921, many tried to 
smuggle alcohol or foreign nationals into the United States without 
authorization along the nation’s borders.60 As a result, the Labor 
Appropriation Act of 1924 authorized legislation that established 
the U.S. Border Patrol, whose primary purpose was to secure the 
borders between lawful points of entry.61 It was by now obvious 
that those in power were determined to limit legal access to the 
United States to those most aligned with the nation’s majority and 
to keep all others out through restrictive legislation or by physical 
force.62 
 
 58.  See id. (explaining that the Act did not apply to Mexico, Central or South 
America, the Caribbean islands, or Newfoundland). 
 59.  See Cohn, supra note 27 (noting that the new quota system capped the 
total number of immigrant visas at 350,000 and did not reverse the ban on Asian 
immigrants). 
 60.  See Border Patrol History, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., 
https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/history (last updated July 
21, 2020) (describing the intersection of these monumental pieces of legislation 
and their effect on the need to increase border patrol efforts) [perma.cc/Y9HU-
KLDY]. 
 61.  See id. (chronicling the steady expansion of U.S. Border Patrol officers’ 
duties to cover both the Mexican and Canadian borders). 
 62.  See Greg Grandin, The Border Patrol Has Been a Cult of Brutality Since 
1924, INTERCEPT (Jan. 12, 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/01/12/border-
patrol-history/ [perma.cc/8DSB-URU9] 
As a result [of the 1924 Immigration Act], new arrivals to the United 
States were mostly white Protestants. Nativists were . . . [unhappy] 
with the fact that Mexico, due to the influence of U.S. business 
interests that wanted to maintain access to low-wage workers, 
remained exempt from the quota system. 
But see Doris Marie Provine, Institutional Racism in Enforcing Immigration Law, 
8 NORTEAMÉRICA 31, 32 (2013) (“[M]uch of the pressure for exclusion comes from 
citizens themselves, not from the top, where commercial interests and 
international diplomacy may dictate a more cosmopolitan approach.”). 
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C. The Swinging Party Pendulum:  Majority Rules 
Political parties in the United States have continually evolved 
since the Democratic-Republican Party became the Democratic 
Party in 1828, and the Whig Party emerged in 1834 in protest of 
President Jackson’s leadership.63 The Democratic party was 
originally pro-slavery and particularly focused on preserving 
national security.64 The Republican Party, in contrast, was 
founded in 1854 in opposition to the westward expansion of 
slavery.65 Allegiance to the Democratic Party was later divided by 
geography, with Northern Democrats supporting an anti-slavery 
presidential nominee, and Southern Democrats nominating a 
pro-slavery candidate at the 1860 National Convention.66 It was 
this political divide that allowed the Republican Party’s candidate, 
Abraham Lincoln, to win the 1860 presidential election.67 
Today, the Democratic party is known for passing Civil Rights 
Era legislation and healthcare reform, calling itself the party of 
everyday Americans.68 Conversely, the Republican Party generally 
 
 63.  See MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY:  
JACKSONIAN POLITICS AND THE ONSET OF THE CIVIL WAR 33 (1999) (“Convinced of 
Andrew Jackson’s unpopularity in the spring of 1834 . . . , national Whig leaders 
hoped to transplant their party to the states in 1834 and 1835 and build 
momentum for the 1836 presidential election by stressing . . . presidential 
despotism and Democratic depression.”); see also Democratic Party, HISTORY.COM 
(Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.history.com/topics/us-politics/democratic-party (last 
updated Jan. 20, 2021) (“By the 1840s, Democrats and Whigs were both national 
parties, with supporters from various regions of the country, and dominated the 
U.S. political system; Democrats would win all but two presidential elections from 
1828 to 1856.”) [perma.cc/7JQG-CP8J]. 
 64.  See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Symposium on America’s Constitution:  A 
Biography, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 31, 43 (2008) (describing Democratic president 
Andrew Jackson as hating African Americans and Native Americans and pointing 
out that almost all national political leaders following the Civil War were once 
“slavocrats”). 
 65.  See Republican Party, HISTORY.COM (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://www.history.com/topics/us-politics/republican-party (last updated Feb. 1, 
2021) (describing as one of its platforms the Republican Party’s goal to protect the 
rights of African Americans in postbellum America) [perma.cc/U3RD-W4BH]. 
 66.  See id. (explaining that the point of contention was whether slavery 
should expand into the newly acquired western territories). 
 67.  See id. (noting, however, that Lincoln only won 40% of the popular vote). 
 68.  See Our History, DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., https://democrats.org/who-
we-are/our-history/ (“For more than 200 years, our party has led the fight for civil 
rights, health care, Social Security, workers’ rights, and women’s rights.”) 
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believes that government should be limited, taxes should rarely 
increase, and the border should be secured for safety and a robust 
economy.69 As is almost always the case, it is the political parties’ 
guiding principles that are reflected in national legislation when a 
party holds a majority in Congress and controls the White House.70 
The first federal law restricting immigration to the United 
States was passed by a Republican-controlled Congress and signed 
into law by Republican president Ulysses S. Grant in 1875.71 While 
carefully worded to suggest it was passed in the name of morality 
and American values, the Page Act also had strong, albeit indirect, 
economic motivations.72 Nearly 70 years later, the Bracero 
Agreement of 1942 was enacted in part through executive order by 
Democratic President Franklin D. Roosevelt to provide direct 
economic benefit to the United States when agricultural workers 
were scarce during World War II.73 Roosevelt also signed into law 
 
[perma.cc/N6WW-9S6H]. 
 69.  See Principles for American Renewal, REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., 
https://www.gop.com/principles-for-american-renewal (describing eleven 
principles ranging from healthcare and poverty to security and immigration 
reform) [perma.cc/XG46-NQ34]. 
 70.  See MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE:  ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 158 (2012) (describing how the party in power 
eventually becomes the minority party as a result of passing too much legislation 
to meet its own political ends instead of responding to public preferences). 
 71.  See Congress Profiles, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HIST., ART & 
ARCHIVES, https://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/43rd/ 
(noting that 203 Republicans and 89 Democrats made up the 43d Congress during 
President Grant’s second term when the Page Act became law) [perma.cc/N6ND-
PH8C]; see also Kai Bartolomeo, Immigration and the Constitutionality of Local 
Self Help:  Escondido’s Undocumented Immigrant Rental Ban, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. 
& SOC. JUST. 855, 860 (2008) (“Although relatively narrow in scope, the 
Immigration Act of 1875 barred the entry of ‘cooly’ laborers, prostitutes, and 
immigrants under ‘contract or agreement . . . for lewd and immoral purposes.’”). 
 72.  See 2 CONG. REC., 4001, 4535 (1874) (statement of Republican Sen. Page). 
What would the gentlemen who favor a high protective tariff think if 
these Chinese should take the place of the thousands of women and 
girls who are now employed in the Middle and New England States, 
and thereby throw out of employment thousands of this class who 
depend upon their daily toil for a subsistence? 
 73.  See James F. Creagan, Public Law 78:  A Tangle of Domestic and 
International Relations, 7 J. INTER-AM. STUD. 541, 542 (1965) (“Over 200,000 
workers entered the United States under the war-time program, and the benefits 
were such that neither government was anxious to terminate the program after 
the war. A new agreement was signed in February 1948.”). 
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the Magnuson Act of 1943, which had been introduced in the House 
by a Democratic Representative two months prior.74 This 
legislation effectively repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act and 
provided new benefits to Chinese immigrants.75 If this were seen 
as a national security measure and not a subtle embracing of 
immigrants by the Democratic party, Roosevelt’s death and 
Truman’s succession to the presidency may have been the genesis 
of the new Democratic party.76 
The end of World War II brought with it the displacement of 
millions of Europeans.77 Republicans, holding a majority in both 
the Senate and the House, passed the Displaced Persons Act of 
1948.78 Given the timing of the legislation, President Truman felt 
 
 74.  See Record of the 78th Congress (First Session), CQ PRESS, 
https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1943121500 
(describing how this legislation also established a quota system to permit roughly 
105 Chinese immigrants to enter the United States annually) [perma.cc/QP24-
DPMC]. Notably, the Democratic Party controlled both the Senate and the House 
at the time. See Congress Profiles:  78th Congress (1943–1945), U.S. HOUSE 
REPRESENTATIVES, HIST., ARTS & ARCHIVES, 
https://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/78th/  (noting that the 
78th Congress was made up by 222 Democrats and 209 Republicans in the House) 
[https://perma.cc/H7LK-7J84]; Party Division, U.S. SENATE, 
https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm (indicating that there were 57 
Democrats and 38 Republicans in the Senate) [perma.cc/4MQW-FJ4A]. 
 75.  See Record of the 78th Congress (First Session), CQ PRESS, 
https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1943121500 
(describing how this legislation also established a quota system to permit roughly 
105 Chinese immigrants to enter the United States annually) [perma.cc/QP24-
DPMC]. 
 76.  See id. (“‘I regard this legislation as important in the cause of winning 
the war and of establishing a secure peace,’ the President said.”); see also SEAN J. 
SAVAGE, TRUMAN AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY 1 (1997) 
Truman’s chronic internal conflicts and political changes closely 
paralleled those of the Democratic party . . . . During his lifetime it 
became a northern- and urban-dominated majority party whose liberal 
policy objectives and philosophy were committed to using a big, 
activist, innovative federal government for reforming and regulating 
big business and focusing on the special policy interests of blacks, 
organized labor, and major cities. 
 77.  See, e.g., Imre Ferenczi, Relocation of Europeans, 237 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 172, 172 (1945) (“[T]he United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA) estimated that there were between 20,000,000 and 
30,000,000 Europeans who had been uprooted from their homes by the war 
pending their repatriation or settlement . . . . [A year later] the number was 
estimated to be around 20,000,000.”). 
 78.  See Displaced Persons Act of 1948, 2d Sess., ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009–10 
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he had no option but to sign the bill into law.79 Truman, a lifelong 
Democrat, issued a statement regarding his difficult decision not 
to veto the bill and to point out Congress’s intentional efforts to 
discriminate against those in desperate need of life-saving 
assistance.80 Just four months after he released this statement, 
Truman was elected to a second term.81 Some took this victory to 
mean that a majority of Americans sided with Truman’s views on 
immigration.82 
In 1951, the Democratic-controlled House introduced what 
would become the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.83 This 
prodigious Act codified all prior immigration and naturalization 
laws, extended limited immigration quotas to Asian countries, and 
 
(1948) (listing, among other limitations, that eligible persons must have become 
displaced on or after September 1, 1939 and on or before December 22, 1945, and 
must not become a public charge to the United States); see also Refugee Timeline, 
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-
history/history-office-and-library/featured-stories-from-the-uscis-history-office-
and-library/refugee-timeline (last updated July 28, 2020) (“The law required that 
admitted displaced persons find a place to live in the U.S. and a job that would 
not replace a worker already in the country.”) [perma.cc/UAT8-2D4C]. 
 79.  See Milan J. Kubic, ‘Keep Refugees Out!’ We’ve Been Here Before, 
NEWSWEEK (Jan. 24, 2016), https://www.newsweek.com/refugees-been-here-
418862 (explaining that the Republican-controlled Congress waited until the last 
day of the session to present President Truman with the bill to discourage him 
from vetoing what he believed was discriminatory legislation) [perma.cc/5HKU-
8GG9]. 
 80.  See Harry S. Truman, Statement by the President Upon Signing the 
Displaced Persons Act, PUB. PAPERS (June 25, 1948), 
https://archive.org/details/4728453.1948.001.umich.edu/page/382 (“If the 
Congress were still in session, I would return this bill without my approval and 
urge that a fairer, more humane bill be passed. In its present form this bill is 
flagrantly discriminatory . . . . The 80th Congress certainly had ample time to 
produce a satisfactory bill.”) [perma.cc/EU5T-YCC9]. 
 81.  See Kubic, supra note 79 (“That November, Truman, against all 
expectations, won a victory that not only kept him in office but also put the 
Democrats in charge of both the House and the Senate.”). 
 82.  See id. (“The astonishing victory in part reflected voters’ growing 
recognition that Truman was right on the immigration issue.”). 
 83.  See The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 as Amended Through 
1961, 1 INT’L MIGRATION DIG. 34, 34 (1964) [hereinafter “INA as Amended 
Through 1961”] (“This bill was distributed to the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, the Department of State and a number of non-governmental agencies for 
study. On the basis of their suggestions and analyses a new bill . . . was 
introduced . . . by [democrat] Senator McCarran.”). The Senate was also 
controlled by Democrats. See Party Division, supra note 74 (indicating that there 
were 54 Democrats and 42 Republicans in the Senate). 
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was the first immigration law to favor skilled immigrants over 
relatives of U.S. citizens.84 There was no hiding progressive 
President Truman’s views on the restrictive provisions of the Act, 
which he clearly demonstrated by vetoing the legislation.85 
Nonetheless, the Democratic-controlled Congress quickly overrode 
Truman’s veto, and the bill became law.86 
In 1965, the Democratic-controlled 89th Congress passed, and 
Democratic President Lyndon B. Johnson signed into law, an 
amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act to eliminate 
the existing national origins quota system.87 At the same time, this 
legislation also created the first numerical limitation on visas 
granted to citizens from the Western Hemisphere.88 Applicants 
from these countries were required to prove that they were capable 
laborers or professionals and would not displace U.S. workers, 
which created a bureaucratic backlog of several years for 
successful applicants to receive their visas.89 
 
 84.  See INA as Amended Through 1961, supra note 83, at 37 (“First 
preference (50 percent of quota plus portions not used under second and third 
preferences) for aliens whose services are needed urgently in the United States 
because of their education training, experience or ability, and their spouses and 
children.”). 
 85.  See The Truman Presidency and Immigration, BOUNDLESS (June 4, 
2017), https://www.boundless.com/blog/truman/ (explaining how President 
Truman found the law’s national origins and racially constructed quotas to be 
discriminatory) [perma.cc/G99M-4RK5]. 
 86.  See INA as Amended Through 1961, supra note 83, at 35 (“[The House 
[voted] 278 to 113 [to override the veto] with 40 Representatives not voting, 
and . . . the Senate did likewise by a vote of 57 to 26, with 13 Senators not 
voting.”). 
 87.  See Congress Profiles:  89th Congress (1965–1967), U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, HIST., ARTS & ARCHIVES, 
https://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/89th/ (stating Lydon 
Johnson won the election in a landside) [perma.cc/8V6X-Y9A5]; Party Division, 
U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm (indicating that there 
were 68 Democrats and 32 Republicans in the Senate) [perma.cc/8APK-7Q28]; see 
also Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 
(1965) (replacing the former quota system with a multi-category system of 
preference including that of skilled immigrants). 
 88.  See Bill Ong Hing, Institutional Racism, ICE Raids, and Immigration 
Reform, 44 U. S.F. L. REV. 307, 328 (2009) (noting that the Western Hemisphere 
received only 120,000 immigrant visas each year, and applicants were required 
to meet extensive labor certification requirements). 
 89.  See id. (“Waivers of the labor certification requirement were available, 
however, for certain applicants, such as parents of U.S. citizen children.”). 
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Fortieth U.S. President Ronald Reagan was a liberal 
Democrat before entering politics.90 After changing parties, 
serving two terms as governor of California, and winning the 
Republican Presidential nomination in 1980, Reagan went on to 
win the presidency over Democratic incumbent Jimmy Carter with 
more than 90% of electoral votes.91 Halfway through his second 
presidential term, Reagan benefited from a Republican majority in 
the Senate but still had to contend with a Democratic majority in 
the House.92 At that time, Republican Senator Alan Simpson 
introduced a bill that would become the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 in an attempt to curb the number of 
undocumented immigrants in the United States.93 It was clear that 
the tides had once again turned from the Democratic policy geared 
towards helping displaced immigrants to a Republican-controlled 
Senate and Executive that wanted to drastically reduce the 
number of immigrants seeking work in the United States.94 In fact, 
 
 90.  See 40. Ronald Reagan, WHITE HOUSE, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/ronald-reagan/ 
(contributing Reagan’s shift to the Republican Party to disputes over Communism 
in Hollywood during his time as president of the Screen Actors Guild) 
[perma.cc/6W9W-R2A3]. 
 91.  See id. (“Reagan won 489 electoral votes to 49 for President Jimmy 
Carter.”). 
 92.  See Party Division, U.S. SENATE, 
https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm (indicating that there were 53 
Republicans and 47 Democrats in the Senate) [perma.cc/8APK-7Q28]; Congress 
Profiles:  99th Congress (1985–1987), U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HIST., 
ARTS & ARCHIVES, https://history.house.gov/Congressional-
Overview/Profiles/99th/ (noting that the 99th Congress was made up of 254 
Democrats and 181 Republicans in the House) [perma.cc/H4ES-JHQ6]. 
 93.  See Steven Alan Elberg, Agriculture and the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986:  Reform or Relapse?, 3 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 197, 197 
(1993) (“The product of a turbulent history, IRCA expressed Congressional intent 
to control the entry of undocumented workers into the U.S. by prohibiting their 
employment, thereby removing the economic incentive for illegal immigration.”); 
see also Pamela D. Nichols, The United States Immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1986:  A Critical Perspective, 8 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 503, 517 (1987) 
(describing how the Act also created a special agricultural worker program to 
provide legal entry into, and possible legal status in, the United States for 
immigrant workers skilled at harvesting perishable crops). 
 94.  See Nichols, supra note 93, at 197–98 (“The primary aim of IRCA was to 
reduce the overall influx of illegal refugees to the U.S., while asserting greater 
levels of management and control over the rising tide of foreign farm workers 
seeking employment in U.S. agriculture.”). 
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the IRCA authorized sanctions on employers who hired 
undocumented noncitizens.95 
III. Part II:  EB-2 Immigrant Visas and National Interest Waivers 
A. Employment-Based Immigrant Visas 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended, 
covers regulation of matters relating to Aliens and Nationality in 
the United States.96 The USCIS is the executive agency in charge 
of following the extensive immigration procedures outlined in the 
INA.97 Title II of the Act focuses specifically on immigration to the 
United States.98 An overwhelming majority of immigrants receive 
either family- or employment-based visas to gain entry to the 
United States.99 Each fiscal year, running from October 1 to 
 
 95.  See id. at 198 (“For the first time in U.S. history, employers who 
knowingly hire undocumented workers can be fined or jailed.”). 
 96.  See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101, 66 Stat. 
163, 167 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101) [hereinafter “INA of 
1952”] (dividing the Act into five titles: (I) General Provisions; (II) Immigration; 
(III) Nationality and Naturalization; (IV) Refugee Assistance; and (V) Alien 
Terrorist Removal Procedures); see also The Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952 (The McCarran-Walter Act), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/immigration-act (“It revised the 
1924 system to allow for national quotas at a rate of one-sixth of one percent of 
each nationality’s population in the United States in 1920. As a result, 85 percent 
of the 154,277 visas available annually were allotted to individuals of northern 
and western European lineage.”) [https://perma.cc/A75S-HLG7]. 
 97.  See What We Do, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Apr. 12, 2018), 
https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/what-we-do (last updated Feb. 27, 2020) (listing 
eight broad services provided by USCIS, including, most notably, managing the 
processes of family- and employment-based immigration) [perma.cc/P73T-RMT8]. 
 98.  See id. (showing provisions regulating the specific areas of immigration 
law ranging from worldwide levels of immigration, numerical limitations, and 
allocation of immigrant visas to asylum, inadmissible aliens, and admission of 
nonimmigrants to the U.S.). 
 99.  See U.S. DEP’T STATE, TABLE III:  IMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED, FISCAL YEAR 
2018, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY201
8AnnualReport/FY18AnnualReport%20-%20TableIII.pdf (noting that of the 
533,557 consular immigrant visas allocated in fiscal year 2018, 475,512—or 
89.12%—were family- or employment-based visas) [perma.cc/GCQ2-D8ED]; see 
also The Immigrant Visa Process, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/immigrate/the-immigrant-visa-
process.html (“To be eligible to apply for an immigrant visa, a foreign citizen must 
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September 30, there are 140,000 immigrant visas available for 
foreign nationals who want to immigrate to the United States 
based on their specific professional skills, education, or training.100  
As originally drafted, section 203 of the INA, codified in 8 
U.S.C. § 1153, was called “Allocation of Immigrant Visas Within 
Quotas.”101 This section of the INA designated all immigrant visas 
to foreign nationals in preferential tiers—the first fifty percent of 
available visas were allocated for employment-based applicants; 
the next thirty percent were for immigrants who had U.S. citizen 
children; and the last twenty percent were for the spouses or 
children of lawful permanent residents (LPRs).102 In 1957, section 
203 was amended slightly to authorize an employment-based visa 
holder who was already in the United States to obtain immigrant 
visas for his or her spouse and children still in their home 
country.103 In 1959, Congress changed “children” to “unmarried 
sons or daughters” to extend visa privileges to adult children while 
intentionally excluding married children and their spouses from 
obtaining immigrant visas through a parent’s employment-based 
visa.104 
 
be sponsored by a U.S. citizen relative, U.S. lawful permanent resident, or a 
prospective employer, with a few exceptions . . . .”) [perma.cc/8HQX-K7QQ]. 
 100.  See Permanent Workers, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/permanent-workers (last updated 
Jan. 9, 2020) (listing the five employment-based immigrant visa categories, 
describing the labor certification requirement, and informing applicants that all 
aliens working in the United States may be subject to tax liabilities) 
[perma.cc/GFF7-2UJV]; see also Glossary Term:  Fiscal Year, U.S. SENATE, 
https://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/fiscal_year.htm (defining the 
term ‘fiscal year’ as an accounting period for the federal government) 
[perma.cc/S7TX-CZQE]. This number also includes adjustment of status cases 
where foreign nationals are never issued immigrant visas. 
 101.  See INA of 1952, supra note 96, at 178 (noting that the current code 
section has been amended to remove ‘Within Quotas’ from the title). 
 102.  See id. at 178–79 (indicating that unused visas in any of the three 
categories would be allocated to the siblings and children of U.S. citizens so long 
as no more than 25% of all available immigrant visas went to such purpose). 
 103.  See An Act to Amend the INA, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 85-
316, 71 Stat. 639 (1957) (amending the language of the 1952 statute that only 
allowed such visas if the spouse or children were traveling with the immigrant 
visa holder at the time of entry to the United States). 
 104.  See An Act to Provide for the Entry of Certain Relatives of U.S. Citizens 
and Lawfully Resident Aliens, Pub. L. No. 86-363, 73 Stat. 644 (1959) (adding, in 
addition, the requirement that spouses and unmarried sons or daughters could 
receive non-quota immigrant visas only if they had retained their relationship to 
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In 1965, section 203 was overhauled to give preference to 
family-based visa applicants over employment-based 
petitioners.105 This amendment re-designated how the available 
immigrant visas would be allocated with the first twenty percent 
going to the unmarried sons or daughters of U.S. citizens.106 The 
next twenty percent went to the spouses or unmarried sons or 
daughters of LPRs.107 The next ten percent were for exceptional 
ability employment-based petitioners.108 Then ten percent were 
re-designated for married sons or daughters of U.S. citizens.109 The 
following twenty-four percent were for siblings of U.S. citizens, 
followed by ten percent for immigrants who could perform skilled 
or unskilled labor when such laborers were at a shortage in the 
United States.110 The final six percent were then re-designated for 
asylum-based petitioners.111 The 1976 amendments to section 203 
introduced the pending offer of employment requirement for 
employment-based visas and required U.S. citizens to be at least 
twenty-one years old to sponsor foreign family members applying 
for family-based visas.112 
Today, there are five categories of employment-based visas, 
each designated with a number ranging from EB-1 to EB-5.113 Each 
 
the petitioner at the time of their arrival to the United States). 
 105.  See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 
912, 913 (1965) (specifying how visas would be allotted to those aliens who were 
subject to the numerical limitations). 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  See id. (authorizing up to half of the 6% asylum visas to be given to aliens 
who had been living in the United States continuously for at least two years and 
mandating that waiting lists be maintained under the authority of the Secretary 
of State for all visa tiers). 
 112.  See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 
94-571, 90 Stat. 2705 (1976) (requiring, in addition, aliens present in the United 
States to apply for any immigrant visa for which they become eligible within one 
year of such eligibility or risk forfeiting such procedural right). 
 113.  See Permanent Workers, supra note 100 (providing a general description 
of each employment-based visa preference and indicating that the First 
Preference visas are further divided into three subcategories based on 
extraordinary ability, outstanding professors and researchers, and multinational 
managers or executives). EB-1 preference is reserved for persons of extraordinary 
ability; EB-2 is generally for those with advanced degrees or of exceptional ability; 
IT’S MY PARTY 725 
of the first three categories, EB-1 to EB-3, is allotted no more than 
28.6% of the available employment-based visas allocated 
worldwide annually.114 The EB-4 and EB-5 visas, in contrast, each 
have a limit of 7.1% of worldwide employment-based visas 
allocated each year.115 Petitioners may apply at a U.S. consulate in 
their home country for an employment-based immigrant visa or, if 
in the United States, to adjust from non-immigrant to immigrant 
status.116 The second preference or category of permanent worker 
visas, and the focus of this Note, “is reserved for persons who are 
members of the professions holding advanced degrees or for 
persons with exceptional ability in the arts, sciences, or 
business.”117 During the 2018 fiscal year, which ended on 
September 30, 2019, there were 40,641 EB-2 visas allocated 
worldwide.118 This was a 3.91% increase from 2016, a 17.18% 
decrease from 2014, and a 19.67% decrease from 2012.119 
 
EB-3 is reserved for skilled workers; EB-4 is for special immigrants; and EB-5 is 
reserved for business investors. Id. 
 114.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(b)(1)–(3) (2018); see also CONG. RSCH. SERV., PERMANENT 
EMPLOYMENT-BASED IMMIGRATION AND THE PER-COUNTRY CEILING 4 (Dec. 21, 
2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45447.pdf (noting that all unused EB-1 
visas are reallocated to EB-2 petitioners; unused EB-2 visas are reallocated to 
EB-3 petitioners; and unused EB-3 visas are reallocated to EB-4 petitioners) 
[perma.cc/2KMX-E6GW]. 
 115.  See id. §§ 1153(b)(4)–(5). 
 116.  See CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 114, at 3 (“Adjusting status refers to 
the process of changing from a temporary (nonimmigrant) status (e.g., F-1 
student visa, H-1B skilled temporary worker visa) to LPR status.”). 
 117.  Permanent Workers, supra note 100; see also Elizabeth A. McGeary, The 
Reconciliation of Prominence and Exceptional Ability:  A Necessary Step Toward 
a Coordinated Immigration Policy, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 977, 981 (1990) (“Neither the 
statutory amendment nor the congressional debates preceding the enactment of 
the amendment adequately defined the meaning of ‘exceptional ability;’ however, 
words like ‘skills and talents, outstanding talents,’ and ‘knowledge and unique 
skills’ were used by various legislators to describe the immigrants who would 
qualify for third preference.”). 
 118.  See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TABLE V (PART 2):  IMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED AND 
ADJUSTMENTS OF STATUS SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 2018, 
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2018Ann
ualReport/FY18AnnualReport%20-%20TableV-Part2.pdf [hereinafter “2018 EB-2 
Visa Statistics”] (noting that 2,221 visas went to Africa, 22,900 went to Asia, 8,388 
to Europe, 3,890 to North America, 340 to Oceania, and 2,902 went to South 
America) [perma.cc/5S43-THXJ]. 
 119.  See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TABLE V (PART 2):  IMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED AND 
ADJUSTMENTS OF STATUS SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 2016, 
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2016Ann
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B. National Interest Waivers 
In 1991, Congress authorized national interest waivers of the 
job-offer and Permanent Labor Certification (labor certification) 
requirements for certain foreign nationals holding advanced 
degrees or of exceptional ability.120 Congress has defined aliens of 
exceptional ability as applicants who can show at least three of the 
following: 
(A) An official academic record showing that the alien has a 
degree, diploma, certificate, or similar award from a college, 
university, school, or other institution of learning relating to the 
area of exceptional ability;  
(B) Evidence in the form of letter(s) from current or former 
employer(s) showing that the alien has at least ten years of 
full-time experience in the occupation for which he or she is 
being sought;  
(C) A license to practice the profession or certification for a 
particular profession or occupation;  
(D) Evidence that the alien has commanded a salary, or other 
renumeration for services, which demonstrates exceptional 
ability;  
(E) Evidence of membership in professional associations; or  
(F) Evidence of recognition for achievements and significant 
contributions to the industry or field by peers, governmental 
 
ualReport/FY16AnnualReport-TableV-Part2.pdf [hereinafter “2016 EB-2 Visa 
Statistics”] (indicating that there were 39,111 EB-2 visas allocated) 
[perma.cc/JUC3-9YXK]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TABLE V (PART 2):  IMMIGRANT VISAS 
ISSUED AND ADJUSTMENTS OF STATUS SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS, FISCAL 
YEAR 2014, 
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2014Ann
ualReport/FY14AnnualReport-TableV.pdf [hereinafter “2014 EB-2 Visa 
Statistics”] (indicating that there were 49,071 EB-2 visas allocated) 
[perma.cc/3AKH-DUWF]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TABLE V (PART 2):  IMMIGRANT 
VISAS ISSUED AND ADJUSTMENTS OF STATUS SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS, 
FISCAL YEAR 2012, 
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2012Ann
ualReport/FY12AnnualReport-TableV-PartII.pdf [hereinafter “2012 EB-2 Visa 
Statistics”] (indicating that there were 50,593 EB-2 visas allocated) 
[perma.cc/S4A2-RKCZ]. 
 120.  See Employment-Based Immigrants, 56 Fed. Reg. 60,897, 60,900 (Nov. 
9, 1991) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 204) (“The Service has consulted with 
Congressional sources and the Department of Labor on this issue, and all parties 
are in agreement that exemption from, or waiver of, the job offer constitutes 
waiver of the labor certification. The final rule reflects this determination.”). 
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entities, or professional or business organizations.121 
In 2014, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson, 
appointed by Democratic President Barack Obama, directed 
USCIS to increase the number of national interest waivers granted 
each year in order to boost the United States’ economy.122 
To determine if a petitioner qualifies for a national interest 
waiver, immigration judges turned to self-made protocols, now 
adopted by USCIS, as Congress has not passed legislation to guide 
the administration of the waivers.123 EB-2 visa applicants seeking 
a waiver must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence: 
(1) [T]hat the foreign national’s proposed endeavor has both 
substantial merit and national importance;  
(2) that the foreign national is well positioned to advance the 
proposed endeavor; and  
(3) that, on balance, it would be beneficial to the United States 
to waive the requirements of a job offer and thus of a labor 
certification.124 
Prior to this framework, the governing standard, also a 
precedent decision, required applicants to be qualified for a job of 
“substantial intrinsic merit,” whose benefit was “national in 
scope,” and where granting the national interest waiver would be 
more beneficial to the United States than requiring the labor 
certification.125 One reason for the change was to clarify and 
 
 121.  Petitions for Employment-Based Immigrants, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii) 
(2020). 
 122.  See Memorandum from Sec’y of Homeland Sec. Jeh Johnson to U.S. 
Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. Dir. León Rodríguez 3 (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_business_act
ions.pdf (“To enhance opportunities for foreign inventors, researchers, and 
founders of start-up enterprises wishing to conduct research and development 
and create jobs in the United States, I hereby direct USCIS to implement two 
administrative improvements to our employment-based immigration 
system . . . .”) [perma.cc/3LRK-YRM7]. 
 123.  See Dhanasar, 26 I. & N. Dec. 884, 886 (Dec. 27, 2016) (“Undefined by 
statute and regulation, ‘national interest’ is a broad concept subject to various 
interpretations.”). 
 124.  Id. at 889. 
 125.  See N.Y. State Dep’t Transp., 22 I. & N. Dec. 215, 217–18 (Aug. 7, 1998) 
(“The labor certification process exists because protecting the jobs and job 
opportunities of U.S. workers having the same objective minimum qualifications 
as an alien seeking employment is in the national interest.”). 
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prevent too narrow an interpretation of the previous three-pronged 
test.126 
C. Who Is This Affecting? 
While data showing the number of national interest waivers 
granted and denied each year are not available, the Department of 
State does publish the number of EB-2 visas each foreign state 
receives annually.127 If national interest waivers are necessary for 
some EB-2 petitioners to apply for their employment-based visas, 
a worldwide survey of EB-2 visa allocations by continent may 
demonstrate potential biases in visa allocations.128 Table 1 
illustrates the percentage of EB-2 visas allocated to petitioners 
from each of the six inhabited regions as defined by USCIS—
Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, Oceania, and South 
America—from fiscal years 2012 to 2018.129 This table does not 
show the denial rates of EB-2 visas or national interest waivers 
from each region. If Congress—or the American people—sees only 
these statistics, the Executive will be free to make a case that there 
are absolutely no biases or preferential treatment when USCIS 
grants or denies national interest waivers.130 
 
 126.  See Dhanasar, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 887 
[T]he first prong has held up under adjudicative experience, the term 
‘intrinsic’ adds little to the analysis . . . . Similarly, the second prong 
has caused relatively few problems in adjudications, but occasionally 
the term ‘national in scope’ is construed too narrowly by focusing 
primarily on the geographic impact of the benefit. 
 127.  See Visa Statistics, U.S. DEP’T STATE, 
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visa-statistics.html 
(“[P]roviding statistical information on immigrant and non-immigrant visa 
issuances by consular offices, as well as information on the use of visa numbers 
in numerically limited categories.”) [perma.cc/7YFK-HR44]. 
 128.  See infra Table 1 (showing a significantly greater percentage of visas 
allocated to Asia compared to all other regions). 
 129.  See Visa Statistics, supra note 127 (listing visa statistics from fiscal years 
2000 to 2019). 
 130.  See Jonathan K. Stubbs, Perceptual Prisms and Racial Realism:  The 
Good News about a Bad Situation, 45 MERCER L. REV. 773, 823 (1994) (“One can 
use one’s perceptions to see what one wants to see, be blind to what one wishes 
not to see, and use what one sees like a politician uses statistics; that is, one can 
make statistics ‘say’ what one wants.”). 
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Table 1 
Percentage of EB-2 Visa Allocations Per Region 
for Fiscal Years 2012 to 2018 
Region/ 





2012131 2.77 74.71 10.93 5.58 0.38 5.63 
2013132 3.71 67.74 14.54 7.82 0.50 5.69 
2014133 2.36 78.48 10.26 4.89 0.36 3.65 
2015134 4.04 61.83 18.78 8.97 0.73 5.65 
2016135 4.64 57.84 19.65 9.83 0.65 7.39 
 
 131.  See id. (same). 
 132.  See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TABLE V (PART 2):  IMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED AND 
ADJUSTMENTS OF STATUS SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 2013, 
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2013Ann
ualReport/FY13AnnualReport-TableV-PartII.pdf [hereinafter “2013 EB-2 
Statistics”] (listing 2,354 EB-2 visas issued for the region of Africa, 42,986 for 
Asia, 9,228 for Europe, 4,965 for North America, 315 for Oceania, and 3,613 for 
South America) [perma.cc/K6K5-F8TG]. 
 133.  See 2014 EB-2 Visa Statistics, supra note 119 (listing 1,158 EB-2 visas 
issued for Africa, 38,512 for Asia, 5,034 for Europe, 2,402 for North America, 175 
for Oceania, and 1,790 for South America). 
 134.  See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TABLE V (PART 2):  IMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED AND 
ADJUSTMENTS OF STATUS SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 2015, 
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2015Ann
ualReport/FY15AnnualReport-TableV-Part2.pdf [hereinafter “2015 EB-2 
Statistics”] (listing 1,796 EB-2 visas issued for Africa, 27,500 for Asia, 8,353 for 
Europe, 3,989 for North America, 326 for Oceania, and 2,515 for South America) 
[perma.cc/5CHH-J4HJ]. 
 135.  See 2016 EB-2 Visa Statistics, supra note 119 (listing 1,814 EB-2 visas 
issued for Africa, 22,620 for Asia, 7,687 for Europe, 3,845 for North America, 255 
for Oceania, and 2,890 for South America). 
730 27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 703 (2021) 
2017136 5.08 54.64 21.18 10.18 0.79 8.13 
2018137 5.46 56.35 20.64 9.57 0.84 7.14 
IV. Part III:  Why Judicial Review Is Vital 
A. Granting National Interest Waivers Is Not Discretionary 
Prior to the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), the INA clearly 
allowed Article III courts to review final orders of deportation and 
exclusion.138 District courts were permitted to review just about 
any final decisions that were made during deportation proceedings 
often by way of habeas petitions.139 The United States Supreme 
Court held, for example, that the “refusal by the Attorney General 
to grant a suspension of deportation is one of those ‘final orders of 
deportation’ of which direct review by Courts of Appeals is 
authorized under s[ection] 106(a) of the Act.”140 
 
 136.  See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TABLE V (PART 2):  IMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED AND 
ADJUSTMENTS OF STATUS SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 2017, 
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2017Ann
ualReport/FY17AnnualReport%20-TableV-PartII.pdf [hereinafter “2017 EB-2 
Statistics”] (listing 2,032 EB-2 visas issued for Africa, 21,836 for Asia, 8,462 for 
Europe, 4,068 for North America, 315 for Oceania, and 3,248 for South America) 
[perma.cc/BXA2-R5DD]. 
 137.  See 2018 EB-2 Visa Statistics, supra note 118 (listing 2,221 EB-2 visas 
issued for the region of Africa, 22,900 for Asia, 8,388 for Europe, 3,890 for North 
America, 340 for Oceania, and 2,902 for South America). 
 138.  See David B. Pakula & Lawrence P. Lataif, Judicial Review of 
Administrative Immigration Decisions:  Can the Doctrine of “Ejusdem Generis” 
Save It From Extinction?, 78 FLA. BAR J. 32, 33 (2004) (“Section 106(a) [of the INA] 
granted exclusive jurisdiction to the U.S. courts of appeal to review final orders 
of deportation. Section 106(b) made habeas corpus the exclusive vehicle for review 
of exclusion orders (decisions denying entry into the U.S.).”). 
 139.  See id. at 33 n.5 (“Pre-IIRIRA cases relied on 8 U.S.C. §1329 as conferring 
subject matter jurisdiction on the district courts to review the INS’ predeportation 
[sic] proceeding immigration decisions. The IIRIRA amended 8 U.S.C. §1329 to 
limit its applicability to suits brought by the government.”). 
 140.  Foti v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 375 U.S. 217, 221 (1963). 
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The IIRIRA limited judicial review by providing that 
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including 
interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory 
provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought 
to remove an alien from the United States under this 
subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final 
order under this section. Except as otherwise provided in this 
section, no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under 
section 2241 of Title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision, 
by section 1361 or 1651 of such title, or by any other provision 
of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order or 
such questions of law or fact.141 
It is also clear that this Act explicitly denies judicial review of all 
discretionary decisions made by the DHS Secretary.142 
There are some circumstances where immigrants in the 
United States who are harmed by executive agency decisions are 
afforded judicial review.143 It is not clear whether the plenary 
powers doctrine, which would preclude judicial review of executive 
agency decisions based on statutory authorizations, allows 
Congress to classify aliens by race when drafting legislation.144 
Some legal scholars have argued that the plenary power should be 
reexamined because the rationales the Supreme Court relied on in 
originating the doctrine are flawed or no longer exist.145 At any 
 
 141.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (2018). 
 142.  See id. § 1252(g) (“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or 
claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the 
Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal 
orders against any alien under this chapter.”); see also cases cited infra note 164 
(describing due process protections afforded to immigrants within the United 
States). 
 143.  See, e.g., Margaret Mikyung Lee, An Overview of Judicial Review of 
Immigration Matters, CONG. RSCH. SERV. 4 (Sept. 11, 2013) (citing 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1), which authorizes judicial review of final orders of removal). 
 144.  See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold:  Race Discrimination 
and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 9 (1998) 
(“Although the . . . [INA] generally prohibits discrimination on the basis of ‘race, 
sex, nationality, place of birth, or place or residence,’ the [IIRIRA] created a 
substantial exception, authorizing the State Department to use race (as well as 
religion, sex, and other factors) in establishing visa application procedures and 
locations.”). 
 145.  See, e.g., id. at 10 (“[T]he cases that created the plenary power doctrine 
suggest racial bias on the part of the Justice Department that prosecuted the 
cases and the Justices of the Supreme Court who decided them. The . . . cases may 
have been decided as they were because of the race of the aliens involved.”). 
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rate, the Supreme Court has not closed the door on judicial review 
for immigrants denied entry to or ordered removed from the United 
States.146 
Title 8 U.S.C. § 1155 authorizes the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to revoke an immigrant visa that he or she had previously 
approved so long as there is good and sufficient cause.147 While this 
authority is found in section 205 of the amended INA, it was 
originally authorized in section 206 when the Act first passed.148 
Section 206 allowed the Attorney General to revoke an approved 
visa so long as he or she mailed a notice of revocation to the 
petitioner’s last known address and the Secretary of State 
effectively notified the foreign national before she left her home 
country en route to the United States.149 Today, however, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security is not statutorily required to 
ensure that visa holders are notified that their validly authorized 
visas have been revoked, barring the immigrants from entering the 
country.150 
If an employment visa is granted and subsequently revoked by 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, Article III courts are allowed 
to review the Secretary’s decision for abuse of discretion.151 In ANA 
International, the Ninth Circuit was presented with the question 
of “whether the Attorney General’s decision to revoke a visa 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1155 [was] barred from judicial 
 
 146.  See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 793 n.5 (1977) 
Our cases reflect acceptance of a limited judicial responsibility under 
the Constitution even with respect to the power of Congress to regulate 
the admission and exclusion of aliens, and there is no occasion to 
consider in this case whether there may be actions of the Congress with 
respect to aliens that are so essentially political in character as to be 
nonjusticiable. 
 147.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (2018) (“Such revocation shall be effective as of the 
date of approval of any such petition.”). 
 148.  See INA of 1952, supra note 96, at 181 (maintaining the same section 
title of “Revocation of Approval of Petitions” in both the original and current 
versions of the Act). 
 149.  See id. (noting that the authority to revoke an approved visa now belongs 
to the Secretary of Homeland Security and not the Attorney General). 
 150.  See § 1155 (“Such revocation shall be effective as the date of approval of 
any such petition.”). 
 151.  See, e.g., ANA Int’l, Inc. v. Way, 393 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that visa revocation decisions are reviewable by Article III courts). 
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review . . . .”152 The court held that “the statute does not bar 
judicial review of a visa revocation decision authorized by 
§ 1155.”153 The deciding factor in the court’s analysis was 
Congress’s inclusion of the phrase “for . . . good and sufficient 
cause” paired with the—at that time—Attorney General’s 
authority to revoke the approval of an immigrant visa.154 The day 
after this case was decided, Congress amended 8 U.S.C. § 1155 to 
replace “Attorney General” with “Secretary of Homeland 
Security.”155 Congress did not, however, alter the contingent 
language of the authority to revoke previously approved visas.156 
Title 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(B)(i), which gives the Secretary of 
Homeland Security the power to waive the job-offer and labor 
certification requirements for EB-2 visa petitioners, contains 
similarly contingent language.157 Article III immigration judges 
have a three-pronged test to determine whether or not an applicant 
meets the criteria for a national interest waiver, which USCIS has 
adopted as the criteria for its decisions on national interest waiver 
cases.158 Despite this, the Ninth Circuit, in 2019, held that the 
Secretary’s decision to grant or deny a national interest waiver is 
purely discretionary and not subject to judicial review of any 
kind.159 In Poursina, an Iranian citizen with a doctoral degree in 
 
 152.  Id. at 888. 
 153.  Id. at 889. 
 154.  See id. at 893–94 (“To put a purely subjective construction on the statute 
is to render the words ‘good and sufficient cause’ meaningless. Congress did not 
have to put those words there, and in many other instances it did not.”). 
 155.  See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 
No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004) (striking, in addition, the final two sentences 
of the section, which required effective notice sent to the petitioner to validate the 
revocation). 
 156.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (2018) (keeping the phrase “for what he deems to be 
good and sufficient cause” in the code section). 
 157.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(B)(i) (2018) (“[T]he Attorney General may, 
when the Attorney General deems it to be in the national interest, waive the 
requirements of subparagraph (A) that an alien’s services in the sciences, arts, 
professions, or business be sought by an employer in the United States.”). 
 158.  See Dhanasar, 26 I. & N. Dec. 884, 889 (Dec. 27, 2016) (listing the three 
prongs); see also infra Part III.B (describing the evolution of the three-part test 
as developed through case law). 
 159.  See Poursina v. USCIS, 936 F.3d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Congress’s 
use of ‘may’—rather than ‘must’ or ‘shall’—brings along the usual presumption of 
discretion.”). 
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mechanical engineering sought a national-interest waiver to 
adjust from nonimmigrant student status to permanent 
resident.160 When USCIS denied Poursina’s waiver and he 
appealed the decision, the Administrative Appeals Office simply 
stated that the applicant failed to demonstrate that granting the 
waiver was in the national interest of the United States.161 While 
Poursina sought appellate relief based on procedural defects, it is 
unclear exactly why USCIS denied his request for a 
national-interest waiver or whether their decision was based on 
issues of national security or Poursina’s race.162 Whatever their 
reasoning was, if left unchecked, the DHS Secretary and USCIS 
are free to discriminate against national interest waiver applicants 
based on their immutable traits.163 
B. Competing National Interests 
The Supreme Court has long held that the Due Process and 
Equal Protection rights of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
apply to all persons located within the borders of the United States 
regardless of their citizenship or legal status.164 Aliens located 
 
 160.  See id. at 869–70 (seeking an adjustment of status since he applied from 
within the United States after his student visa expired). 
 161.  See id. at 870 (resulting in dismissal of Poursina’s case). 
 162.  See id. (describing the procedural history of the case without mention of 
whether USCIS allowed Poursina to supplement his petition with further 
evidence that he met the Dhanasar factors). 
 163.  Cf. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 527 U.S. 471, 488 
(1999) (“[A]n alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert 
selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation.”). 
 164.  See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) 
(“It is true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, 
may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of 
fairness encompassed in due process of law.”); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 
(1976) (holding that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments apply to aliens within 
the jurisdiction of the United States even if in the country unlawfully); see also 
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”) (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 
(“[N]or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”) (emphasis added); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 202 (1982) (“Whatever his 
status under the immigration laws, an alien is a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of 
that term.”). 
IT’S MY PARTY 735 
outside the United States, on the other hand, are not explicitly 
afforded any protections by the U.S. Constitution.165 
In 1950, the Court, interpreting Article II powers, held that  
[T]he decision to admit or to exclude an alien may be lawfully 
placed with the President, who may in turn delegate the 
carrying out of this function to a responsible executive officer of 
the sovereign, such as the Attorney General. The action of the 
executive officer under such authority is final and conclusive. 
Whatever the rule may be concerning deportation of persons 
who have gained entry into the United States, it is not within 
the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, 
to review the determination of the political branch of the 
Government to exclude a given alien.166 
However, when the rationales for the admission and exclusion or 
removal from the United States of an alien who fulfills the case law 
requirements for a national interest waiver are based on the 
concept of what is best for the country, the political biases of the 
executive officer in charge should not be the tiebreaker.167 
Even if the DHS Secretary does not hold personal biases 
against certain classes of immigrants, he or she is almost always 
making decisions under the President’s command.168 When an 
executive officer defies the President, the officer is likely to be fired 
or forced to resign.169 When a sitting U.S. President makes no effort 
 
 165.  See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 785 (1950) (holding that the 
Fifth Amendment’s due process protections do not apply to aliens outside of the 
United States); United States v. Verdug-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) 
(finding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to nonresident aliens 
located abroad). 
 166.  United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950). 
 167.  Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(B)(i) (2018) (authorizing the Attorney 
General to grant national interest waivers if in the interest of the United States), 
with 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2018) (permitting the Attorney General to deem aliens 
inadmissible to the United States based on reasonable beliefs). 
 168.  Cf. Glen Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and 
Administrative Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 849, 867 (2012) (“The White House’s 
influence on agency decision making is more likely to capture the strength of 
competing interest group pressures, but existing inequalities render an 
unregulated pluralistic conception of the administrative process normatively 
unattractive.”). 
 169.  See, e.g., Peter Baker, Katie Benner, & Michael D. Shear, Jeff Sessions 
Is Forced Out as Attorney General as Trump Installs Loyalist, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/us/politics/sessions-resigns.html 
(describing Sessions’ forced resignation for recusing himself from the Russia 
inquiry and Trump’s immediate appointment of a loyalist as interim Attorney 
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to hide his biases and prejudices against certain immigrants—
especially those from Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East—
it is easy to connect the dots.170 Both candidate and President 
Donald Trump relied heavily on social media to convey 
anti-immigrant policies and sentiments.171 Some have even 
referred to Trump’s immigration policies as selective 
xenophobia.172 An illustration of this is the fact that former 
President Trump signed multiple Executive Orders to limit, 
restrict, and, in some cases, ban immigration from economically 
weak or predominantly Muslim countries.173 To make this point 
 
General) [perma.cc/UMN7-7KMY]. 
 170.  See, e.g., Leighton Akio Woodhouse, Trump’s ‘Shithole Countries’ 
Remark is at the Center of a Lawsuit to Reinstate Protections for Immigrants, 
INTERCEPT (June 28, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/06/28/trump-tps-
shithole-countries-lawsuit/ (“When President Donald Trump referred to Haiti, El 
Salvador, and an assortment of African nations as ‘shithole countries’ during a 
closed-door meeting with congressional leaders and Cabinet members in January, 
he may have unwittingly planted the seed for the unraveling of a critical part of 
his deportation agenda.”) [perma.cc/V7X9-KQDL]; Matthew R. Segal, America’s 
Conscience:  The Rise of Civil Society Groups Under President Trump, 65 UCLA 
L. REV. 1574, 1577–78 (2018) (“President Trump has banned people from several 
Muslim-majority countries; . . . rescinded Temporary Protected Status 
protections for certain immigrants from countries that President Trump 
reportedly regards as ‘shithole[s];’ and taken children hostage to advance his 
anti-immigration policies.”). 
 171.  Twitter permanently deactivated Donald Trump’s Twitter account, but 
several sites archived his tweets. See, e.g., TRUMP TWITTER ARCHIVE, 
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22statement+on+preventing+M
uslim+immigration%22 (“Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration.”) 
[perma.cc/4BGF-NHCN]; TRUMP TWITTER ARCHIVE, 
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22it+is+amazing+how+often+i+
am+right%22 (“It is amazing how often I am right, only to be criticized by the 
media. Illegal immigration, take the oil, build the wall, Muslims, NATO!”) 
[perma.cc/5QHK-ME85]; John Myers, Newsletter:  Trump’s Tweets Fuel Outrage 
and a New Immigration Debate, L.A. TIMES (July 15, 2019), 
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-20190715-story.html 
(“‘Why don’t they go back and help fix the totally broken and crime infested places 
from which they came,’ the president tweeted.”) [perma.cc/W8GW-5ML4]. 
 172.  See Waleed Aly, Donald Trump’s Australia, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/21/opinion/donald-trumps-australia.html 
(“Perhaps, far from leading to a more thorough acceptance of migration, this 
constant demonization of migrants establishes a norm of selective xenophobia 
where exempting a group of migrants from our tolerance is unremarkable.”) 
[perma.cc/E5QQ-V45E]. 
 173.  See President Trump’s Executive Orders on Immigration and Refugees, 
CTR. MIGRATION STUD., https://cmsny.org/trumps-executive-orders-immigration-
refugees/ (describing EOs that expand the use of immigrant detention, limit 
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clearer, former President Trump stated that he preferred 
immigrants from Norway—one of the whitest countries in the 
world—over those from Haiti, El Salvador, and Africa.174 
C. Recommendations 
An alien applying for an EB-2 classification and a national 
interest waiver has to wait up to a year for his case to be 
processed.175 If the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting out of 
personal bias or to avoid losing his or her job, denies the national 
interest waiver and the applicant cannot otherwise obtain an 
employment visa, the alien should not be left without recourse.176 
The solution to this bureaucratic intolerance is not complicated:  
Article III courts must be afforded subject matter jurisdiction to 
review the Secretary’s decision to deny the waiver and determine 
 
asylum, banning immigration from Muslim-majority countries that did not have 
strong economic ties to the United States) [perma.cc/SS6E-G5E4]. 
 174.  See Nurith Aizenman, Trump Wishes We Had More Immigrants From 
Norway. Turns Out We Once Did, NPR (Jan. 12, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/01/12/577673191/trump-
wishes-we-had-more-immigrants-from-norway-turns-out-we-once-did (describing 
Trump’s complaint that the United States receives too many people from “shithole 
countries”) [perma.cc/T6N7-R7VQ]; Jennifer Bendery, Trump’s Homeland 






NjImwtGo3uVHV7GAilu_miDe-mmh7NbFOAIje (“[Norway’s] residents are 83 
percent Norwegian, who are ethnic North Germanic people, and another 8 percent 
is European, according to the CIA’s World Factbook.”) [perma.cc/V6EC-TE33]. 
 175.  See Check Case Processing Times, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times/ (listing six and a half to eight months of 
processing time for cases filed with the Nebraska Service Center and nine to 
twelve months for cases filed with the Texas Service Center) [perma.cc/9KU2-
FP2C]. 
 176.  Statutorily the Attorney General is afforded the power to grant or deny 
the national interest visa. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(B)(i) (2018) (authorizing the 
Attorney General to grant national interest waivers if in the interest of the United 
States). However, in practice, USCIS officers, under the purview of the Attorney 
General, process and decide on national interest waiver petitions. See, e.g., 
Dhanasar, 26 I. & N. Dec. 884, 884 (Dec. 27, 2016) (“The Director of the Texas 
Service Center denied the petition . . . concluding that . . . a waiver of the job offer 
requirement would not be in the national interest of the United States.”). 
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if the applicant’s constitutional rights were violated. In the 
alternative, Congress should enact legislation to require the 
Department of Homeland Security to publish all data regarding 
grants and denials of national interest waivers including the 
country of origin of each applicant. This would make it much more 
difficult for the Executive to hide its biases within misleading 
statistics. 
1. Standard of Review 
Article III judges should be granted jurisdiction to review 
decisions of USCIS under at least an arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review.177 This will allow courts to ensure the 
Dhanasar factors were properly weighed and applicants were not 
discriminated against when their national interest waivers were 
denied. Judicial review is defined as the “court’s power to review 
the actions of other branches or levels of government; [especially] 
the courts’ power to invalidate legislative and executive actions as 
being unconstitutional.”178 It was Chief Justice John Marshall who 
said, “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to 
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that 
rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on 
the operation of each.”179 Since the Secretary of Homeland Security 
is statutorily authorized to both grant a national interest waiver 
and find an alien inadmissible for lawful entry or permanent 
residence based on what is in the interest of the United States, 
there is a potential conflict that needs resolving.180 
When executive agencies or actors make decisions that affect 
private individuals, there is a presumption of judicial review that 
the government must overcome.181 Judicial review of decisions that 
 
 177.  If a denied applicant has evidence of discrimination based on race or 
national origin, strict scrutiny would be a more appropriate standard of review. 
 178.  Judicial Review, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 179.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 180.  Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(B)(i) (2018) (authorizing the Attorney 
General to grant national interest waivers if in the interest of the United States), 
with 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2018) (permitting the Attorney General to deem aliens 
inadmissible to the United States based on reasonable beliefs). 
 181.  See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (“[A] survey of our 
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appear to have political or racist motivations is even more vital.182 
Allowing judicial review “adds one safeguard that is essential to 
individual liberty:  [I]t ensures that a pair of eyes unsupervised by 
the political branches agrees that the INS or State Department 
conclusion is based not on politics but on evidence.”183 
Immigration case law has developed a specific three-prong test 
to determine if an alien qualifies for a national interest waiver.184 
The Secretary of Homeland Security has the authority to grant or 
deny an applicant’s petition for such waiver.185 The post of the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, like many appointed executive 
positions, can be deeply intertwined with the political platforms 
and biases of the president.186 Moreover, immigration judges—
under the purview of the appointed Attorney General—have often 
been assumed to be influenced by the President.187 Article III 
 
cases shows that judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person 
will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the 
purpose of Congress.”). 
 182.  Cf. Knoetze v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 634 F.2d 207, 211 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(“Strong evidence of the politicalization [sic] of an otherwise routine, bureaucratic 
decision might raise a suspicion of discriminatory agency action.”). 
 183.  Zachary Margulis-Ohnuma, Saying What the Law Is:  Judicial Review of 
Criminal Aliens’ Claims Under the Convention Against Torture, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L 
L. & POL. 861, 884 (2001). 
 184.  See Dhanasar, 26 I. & N. Dec. 884, 884 (Dec. 27, 2016) (“(1) that the 
foreign national’s proposed endeavor has both substantial merit and national 
importance; (2) that he or she is well positioned to advance the proposed endeavor; 
and (3) that, on balance, it would be beneficial to the United States to waive the 
job offer and labor certification requirements.”). 
 185.  See § 1153(b)(2)(B)(i) (authorizing the Attorney General to grant 
national interest waivers if in the interest of the United States). 
 186.  Cf. Charlie Savage, Is an Attorney General Independent or Political? Barr 
Rekindles a Debate, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/01/us/politics/attorney-general-barr.html 
[perma.cc/JYS2-TPX5] 
But even as Mr. Barr urged a high standard before accusing political 
opponents of a crime, Democrats accused him of putting his finger too 
much on the opposite end of that scale—acting more like a White 
House counsel, who helps the president work through legal policy 
issues to achieve his agenda, or even a personal lawyer, who mounts a 
vigorous defense against any accusations of wrongdoing. 
 187.  See Catherine Y. Kim, The President’s Immigration Courts, 68 EMORY L. 
J. 1, 6–7 (2018) (“The increased politicization of agency adjudications raises a host 
of thorny questions about the extent to which such proceedings should be 
insulated from political influence. Commentators often assert that presidential 
control over agency adjudications would be normatively, if not constitutionally, 
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judges should, therefore, be afforded the opportunity to review 
decisions of the Secretary of Homeland Security and USCIS under 
an arbitrary and capricious standard of review to evaluate the 
application of the Dhanasar factors and determine if the 
applicant’s constitutional rights were violated.188 
2. Transparency 
Congress should require the Department of Homeland 
Security to publish all data regarding its grants and denials of 
national interest waivers to ensure executive transparency.189 This 
will prevent, or at least deter, the Executive from claiming fair 
adjudication processes based solely on data related to approved 
EB-2 visa petitions that fail to demonstrate who is not receiving a 
visa or national interest waiver.190 Congress relies on this 
mandated reporting device often to ensure that agencies and 
departments from all branches of government are being held 
accountable for their actions.191 
Once DHS is required to publish these data, one of two things 
is likely to happen:  Either DHS will independently adjust the 
number of national interest waivers it approves for individuals 
 
problematic.”). 
 188.  Cf. id. at 34 (“The extent to which agency adjudications are insulated 
from political interference should accommodate both the need to protect the 
interests of the individual as well as the need for democratic accountability. It 
should also adhere to the separation-of-powers principles necessary to protect 
against arbitrary unilateral action.”). 
 189.  Cf. Akua Amaning & Nathan Kasai, Six Things Congress Should do to 
Reform ICE, THIRD WAY (May 16, 2019), https://www.thirdway.org/memo/six-
things-congress-should-do-to-reform-ice (“Congress should require annual, 
comprehensive, public reporting of the agency’s activities pertaining to 
enforcement, detention, and personnel.”) [perma.cc/K39G-XCEZ]. 
 190.  See Transparency, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Openness; 
clarity; unobstructed access, esp. to business and governmental records; lack of 
guile and of any attempt to hide damaging information.”) (emphasis added); see 
also supra Table 1 (reporting percentage of EB-2 visa allocations from 2012 
through 2018). 
 191.  See, e.g., Sources for Finding Mandated Reports to Congress by U.S. 
Federal Agencies, L. LIBRS.’ SOC’Y WASH., D.C. (Sept. 13, 2018), 
https://www.llsdc.org/sources-for-mandated-congressional-reports (listing dozens 
of examples of mandated reports Congress requires legislative, executive, and 
judicial officials to complete for accountability purposes) [perma.cc/27TV-5CEJ]. 
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from neglected regions, or Congress will be able to determine 
whether DHS is favoring certain regions over others when deciding 
who should receive a national interest waiver.192 In either case, 
Congress will have the data necessary to decide whether or not to 
make judicial review for denied national interest petitions explicit 
through statute.193 
3. Overcoming Roadblocks:  The Issue of Standing 
A nonimmigrant foreign national who enters the United 
States legally on a temporary visitor-, student-, business-, or 
worker-visa may choose to adjust his status to apply for lawful 
permanent residency.194 Once obtained, permanent residency 
allows an applicant to eventually apply for citizenship if certain 
criteria are met.195 There is no question that these individuals—
even prior to obtaining U.S. citizenship—have standing to bring 
due process and other constitutional claims in Article III courts 
while residing in the United States.196 Even though some of the 
most prominent U.S. political leaders have demanded otherwise, 
 
 192.  See 5a U.S.C. § 2 (2018) (explaining the purpose of the Inspector General 
Act of 1978, which requires agencies to keep Congress informed so it may take 
corrective legislative actions if necessary). 
 193.  See, e.g., CONG. RSCH. SERV., CONGRESS’S AUTHORITY TO INFLUENCE AND 
CONTROL EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES 11 (Dec. 19, 2018) (“Congress can also 
exert substantial control over administrative agencies by prescribing the 
procedures agencies must employ when exercising delegated powers.”). 
 194.  See Policy Manual:  Chapter 2 – Eligibility Requirements, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.uscis.gov/policy-
manual/volume-7-part-a-chapter-2 (“The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
and certain other federal laws provide over forty different ways for aliens 
to[]adjust status to lawful permanent residence.”) [perma.cc/7CPU-PMV5]. 
 195.  See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., I AM A PERMANENT RESIDENT:  
HOW DO I APPLY FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP? 1 (Oct. 2013), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/B3en.pdf (listing 
eligibility requirements including being 18 or older, an LPR for three or five years, 
a person of good moral character, knowledgeable of U.S. government, literate in 
English in most instances, and physically present in the United States) 
[perma.cc/68ZH-BNHC]. 
 196.  See, e.g., Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (“The fourteenth 
amendment to the constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens. It says: 
‘Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws.’”). 
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the same due process protections apply to all people within the 
borders of the United States, regardless of their legal status.197 
It is also settled law that noncitizens residing outside the 
borders of the United States are not generally afforded due process 
rights under the U.S. constitution.198 However, the Supreme Court 
of the United States has found standing, at least indirectly, in 
cases brought on behalf of noncitizens who were denied entry to 
the United States.199 Congress intentionally created a pathway for 
certain immigrants with advanced degrees or of exceptional ability 
to obtain employment-based visas without an offer of employment 
and labor certification.200 Without judicial review, the criteria for 
waiving these requirements are based largely on what the DHS 
Secretary deems to be in the national interest of the United 
States.201 
It stands to reason that when the Secretary of Homeland 
Security denies a national interest waiver sought by a noncitizen 
residing outside of the United States, a U.S. resident with a bona 
fide relationship with the noncitizen who can demonstrate 
hardship should have standing to bring suit on the noncitizen’s 
behalf.202 Furthermore, since all those residing in the United 
 
 197.  See id. (“These provisions are universal in their application, to all 
persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of 
race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of 
the protection of equal laws.”); see also TRUMP TWITTER ARCHIVE, 
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22we+cannot+allow+all+of+the
se+people%22 (“We cannot allow all of these people to invade our Country. When 
somebody comes in, we must immediately, with no Judges or Court Cases, bring 
them back from where they came.”) [perma.cc/7AW7-7L27]. 
 198.  See cases cited supra note 165 (holding that the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments do not apply to aliens outside the United States). 
 199.  See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2416 (2018) (“[A]n American 
individual who has ‘a bona fide relationship with a particular person seeking to 
enter the country . . . can legitimately claim concrete hardship if that person is 
excluded.’”). 
 200.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(B)(i) (2018) (allowing the Attorney General to 
waive the job-offer and labor certification requirements for EB-2 visa petitioners). 
 201.  Id; see also Dhanasar, 26 I. & N. Dec. 884, 884 (Dec. 27, 2016) (listing the 
three-prong test for determining when USCIS can grant a national interest 
waiver). 
 202.  Cf. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 
(2017) (preventing an Executive Order to exclude certain potential immigrants 
from being enforced against those foreign nationals with bona fide relationships 
with any person or entity in the United States). 
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States stand to benefit from or be harmed by the grant or denial of 
a national interest waiver, there is an argument—albeit a tenuous 
one—that any U.S. resident, regardless of his relationship to the 
noncitizen, should have standing to sue the federal government for 
denying the noncitizen’s waiver.203 Therefore, any person denied a 
national interest waiver, regardless of her geographic location at 
the time of filing, should—either directly or through a surrogate—
have the right to bring her case to an Article III court for review. 
V. Conclusion 
Since its formation, the United States has used immigration 
legislation to achieve economic and moral goals by those it admits 
or denies entry through its borders. Political parties—while 
ever-evolving—have constantly done what is in their best interest 
to advance their own policies and agendas. Regardless of which 
political party controls the White House or legislature, one thing 
is clear:  It is in the interest of the United States to admit aliens 
with advanced degrees and exceptional abilities into the country. 
To underline this understanding, Congress has authorized 
national interest waivers to help those who may not otherwise 
qualify for EB-2 visas to gain entry into the United States. Of 
course, there must be limits on the number of waivers granted, but 
the decisionmakers should not have unbridled discretion when it 
comes to who is worthy of a waiver. When politics, biases, racism, 
and xenophobia seep into and affect government decision-making 
with regards to how these waivers are and are not administered, 
there must be a remedy. Political parties cannot have carte 
blanche to act as they please without oversight or consequences 
when their actions violate Constitutional protections. Judicial 
review of national interest waiver denials in Article III courts can 
provide applicants with a politically neutral forum of review to 
ensure their petitions were adjudicated by USCIS following its own 
objective standards. In addition, requiring DHS to report to 
Congress how it is adjudicating national interest waiver petitions 
 
 203.  See Adam J. Rosser, The National Interest Waiver of IMMACT90, 14 
GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 165, 167 (1999) (“Congress has made clear that the immigration 
of such persons who fill positions requiring an advanced degree or exceptional 
ability, by definition, benefits the national interest.”). 
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may help reduce racial and other constitutionally prohibited biases 
in the process. 
